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The 1930’s saw the widespread use of public opinion polling as a way to inform 
lawmakers and the general public alike of where the masses stood on issues. These polls, 
paired with newspapers and magazines from the time period, offer a rich glimpse into 
1930’s United States. This paper will pull on this extensive pool of primary sources to 
illustrate the story of the United States’ shift from isolationism to interventionism in the 
















Between the Great Depression and the United States’ entrance into World War II, 
there was a drastic shift in American foreign policy.  The 1930’s marked the height of 
American isolationism while the early 1940’s marked some of the most notable 
achievements of American interventionism.  While the attitudes that drove foreign policy 
in the heart of isolationism were clear and the attitudes that brought the country into total 
war are commonly analyzed, what happened between these two distinct practices of 
foreign policy is often overlooked.  What is the story of the United States’ transformation 
from isolationism to interventionism?  
In 1940, an article in the widely read publication Reader’s Digest expressed the 
revolutionary nature of public opinion polling. American public opinion polls served as a 
“mirror” to the public and congressional lawmakers alike—the numbers demonstrated the 
desires and opinions of the people with new transparency.  Lawmakers, the writer 
claimed, followed the polls—“from the White House to the Hill, and down through the 




heavily influenced the decisions of Congress, discredited self-interest lobbyists, and 
forecasted election outcomes.  Revolutionary, these public opinion polls of this author’s 
contemporary were highly regarded as accurate.  Consequently, their accuracy reveals to 
the modern historian the attitudes that drove the country’s transformation from 
isolationism to interventionism. 
Two polling agencies dominated the field.2  Beginning in 1935, George Gallup 
and the Gallup Poll were used as an authority after it correctly predicted the election of 
1936 to go to Roosevelt.  Elmo Roper was another major pollster, and his work was 
reflected in Fortune magazine.  Both were heavily influential in Washington and 
Roosevelt himself often relied on them to glimpse into public opinion.3 
Newspapers were also reflective of regional opinions as well as key to illustrating 
the public sentiment.  As often what one reads has great influence on their opinions, 
especially on such volatile issues as neutrality, papers reflected the opinions of their 
readers.  Articles were closely examined to determine the tone and information that was 
being presented to the American public. 
How did the United States transform from a staunchly isolationist nation to a 
staunchly interventionist one in a mere half decade?  What were the emotions, ideas, and 
opinions that Americans held to be true?  How did these ideas drastically change in such 
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a short period of time?  A study of public opinion has largely ignored the 1930’s and a 
comprehensive study has yet to be produced.  This paper seeks to chart American public 
opinion during this time through examining regional newspapers and polls. 
This paper explores three periods and events to illustrate the turning points of 
opinion.  First, the Isolationist atmosphere of the 1930’s, from which interventionism was 
gradually reincarnated will be examined: what viewpoints and sentiments caused the 
United States to adopt a strict isolationist foreign policy from 1935-1939?  What were 
those policies and how did the public support them?  Next, the Nazi conquest of 
Czechoslovakia was the first significant and quantifiable turning point away from strict 
isolationism.  The Czech Issue, and the Munich Conference that followed, will be 
dissected and the public reaction to both will be examined.  Finally, when World War II 
started in the European Theater with the invasion of Poland, Americans had to decide 
what to do next. Opinion was cemented and a policy far different from the one of 1935 
was established. These subtopics tell the story of the United States’ drastic shift from 
isolationism to interventionism from 1935-1940 through analysis of public opinion. 
After the stock market crash in 1929, the United States was heavily focused on 
domestic issues as foreign policy took a backseat.  As the country’s attention was on 
itself, isolationism was the prevailing attitude of both the public and policy makers.  In 
November 1935, 71% of those surveyed stated that if a foreign nation attacked another 
nation, the United States should not even form with other nations to stop the attack.4   
Such was the extent of noninvolvement—for the majority of the public, any international 
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intervention, let alone war, was distasteful.  This pacifist attitude was widely recognized-
and embraced-among the public.  As one author wrote in the widely read pages of the 
August 1935 Reader’s Digest, “at no time in history has pacifist sentiment been so 
widespread and articulate.”5  With peace as the country’s utmost desire and itself as its 
first priority, the United States sought a strictly non-interventionist policy. 
In addition to the Great Depression, another major factor were the fresh memories 
of the First World War.  With the traumas of war fresh in mind, the Lost Generation 
sought to do everything to prevent another.  People also viewed entering in the war as a 
mistake: Contemporary historians popularized the belief that World War I had been 
orchestrated by merchant elites to gain profit.6  In the September 1935 issue of Reader’s 
Digest, the historian Walter Millis’ Road to War was the supplement.  His work blamed 
the munitions industry and other business elites, as well as the sensationalist press, for 
convincing “innumerable sensible Americans” that “Germans were a peculiarly fiendish 
and brutal race.”7   His work was also demonstrative of the sympathetic, revisionist view 
Americans held about the Versailles Treaty: Americans had “received, in the very first 
days, what was to be perfected as the Allied thesis of the war. It was all due to the 
undemocratic machinations of the Central European “autocracies.”  Americans were now 
to be surprised, shocked (and naturally pleased) to discover how everything they read 
simply confirmed their first judgment.”  The “stupefied Germans discovered themselves 
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convicted before world opinion on the evidence of a few writers whom the vast majority 
of Germans had never read or even heard of.”  Millis painted the Germans as victims of 
World War 1.  While there is truth in his statement, this image convinced the American 
public that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair, and sympathy excused Hitler’s nationalist 
claims to territory.  Many Americans held this attitude, and in August 1937, 31%--a 
substantial portion of the public--believed that the Treaty of Versailles was “too severe.”8 
These scholarly accounts complemented the work of the Nye Committee, whose 
93 hearings of munitions business officials from 1934-1936 further convinced the public 
that the country had been wrongly manipulated into World War I.9  The credibility of the 
government and Wilsonian-interventionist ideals was greatly reduced.  Such sentiments 
ensured that the country was not ready to engage in another war anytime soon. 
The findings of the Nye Committee and this historical assessment of World War I 
carried Congress to action.  Legislators passed the Neutrality Acts of 1935-1939, which 
prohibited trade and loans to all belligerent nations and restricted American travel on 
belligerent ships; and to propose the Ludlow Amendment--which would have made 
Congress only able to declare war through national referendum. The public backed both 
pieces of legislation. At an end of 1935, neutrality was listed as the third most “vital issue 
before the American people” in the Gallup Poll. This served as evidence that the public 
was in support of legislation that addressed what was cited as such a major problem.10  
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Additionally, a November 1935 Gallup Poll showed 75% of people in favor of the 
Ludlow Amendment.11  There was widespread support for such an amendment among all 
parts of the country, and this pattern was mirrored in the support for the Neutrality Laws.  
However, both laws did not see the end of the decade in their original form, and the 
Ludlow Amendment was scrapped all together—a product of the country’s turn to 
interventionism. 
To explain neutrality’s eventual defeat, one has to have a complete picture of the 
policy’s thriving years.  While Americans were isolationist and valued neutrality, only a 
small portion was actually in support of Hitler’s policies.12  This later compelled many to 
convert to war, as most were not blind to the rising monster of Europe.  Intellectuals, 
politicians, and the general public watched the Nazi phenomenon from afar, noting its 
disturbing nature and their malpractice.13  From the start of the Third Reich, newspapers 
had criticized fascism, noting its clash with American values of democracy, and 
cartoonists never missed an opportunity to illustrate Hitler as a cartoon villain. Doctor 
SeussThe morality of the public was largely against fascism, and these attitudes 
contributed to the country’s turn to neutrality when the time came. 
As Europe drew closer to the eve of war, several events shifted American public 
opinion from neutrality to interventionism.  From 1935-1938, a steady decrease in 
																																																																																																																																																																					
 
11  Ibid., 3. 
 
12  This portion can be reflected in those 8,500,000 people who both listened and 
stated that they agreed with Father Charles Coughlin in a May 8, 1938 Gallup Poll. Ibid., 
114. 
 
13  See Emil Lengyel, “An Inside View of the Nazis by a Former Party Member,” 
The New York Times, 87:29163 (November 1937), 3.	
	 7	
isolationist sentiment swept the country.  What happened between 1935-1938 to cause 
isolationism to lose some of its momentum?  Increasing reports from Europe and Asia 
were one factor.  The press, though not pro-interventionist, highlighted the atrocities done 
by the fascists and was sympathetic towards the European nations.  However, the attitude 
of major American newspapers was sure to distinguish these problems as European and 
contained in Europe, and alluded to the “whole broad ocean” that separated the United 
States from Europe.14  This was key to revealing the isolationist undercurrent of the 
country and was reflected in the polls: while most of the public recognized the atrocities 
being committed and sympathized with a non-fascist side, the general consensus was that 
the country should not get involved.15 
Thus was the attitude in August 1938.  Hitler had been having a successful few 
years.  Reports of the Rhineland remilitarization and the Anschluss showed the United 
States’ Germany’s aggressiveness.  Subsequently, Germany began planning an attack on 
Czechoslovakia.  Three and a quarter million Germans lived in the Czech Sudetenland, 
many of whom caught the “virus of National Socialism.”16  By 1938, the majority of 
Sudeten Germans were Czech Nazis, and had been taking orders from Berlin for three 
years.17  They wreaked havoc in the country and protested to be united with Germany. 
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Hitler used this majority as a pretext for assuming the Sudetenland and eventually 
all of Czechoslovakia.  Unaware of Hitler’s larger goal of grabbing all of the country, 
many Europeans believed that “all Hitler wanted was justice for his kinsfolk in 
Czechoslovakia.”18  However, opinions in the United States saw straight through Hitler’s 
demands and postulated that the issue would lead to war.  “It is here that the world war 
will start if it is to come within 1938 to 1939,” wrote the Oregonian of Portland, 
Oregon.19  All around the country, people believed that the issue would result in war if 
not solved. 
Hitler had planned his attack for October 1st.  But when the Czech government 
began to mobilize on their German borders after hearing Germany’s intentions, the issue 
was given a sense of urgency.  As the European powers struggled with negotiations, the 
prospect of war was flipped on and off:  sometimes it seemed as though war was certain 
while others peace was found.  First, on September 15, Chamberlain came to negotiate 
with Hitler in an effort to keep the world out of war.  Armed with an urging of the Czechs 
to follow “self determination”, Chamberlain drafted a plan to negotiate secession with the 
Czechs if that meant the continent would stay out of war.  For the next week, 
Chamberlain and Europe gave a sigh of relief:  it seemed as though the prime minister 
had kept the continent out of war.  The anxiety of American newspapers slightly 
alleviated. As Nonpareil of Council Bluffs, Iowa put it, Chamberlain “at least gained 
delay” and elongated the peace.20  But when Chamberlain returned again to talk over 
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plans with Hitler on September 22, Hitler rejected his proposal, as he wanted to invade 
Czechoslovakia before October 1st rather than to wait for the Sudetenland to be handed 
over to him.  Thus he “burned his bridges” and Europe was again on the edge of war.21  
Newspapers began to print headlines such as “The Crisis Remains”22 and began to worry 
for war. On September 25, Hitler gave a fiery speech that promised an invasion.  The 
world, and the United States, was deeply troubled with the thought of another war.  But 
Hitler quickly changed his mind at the advice of Mussolini, and sought to once again 
negotiate.  On September 29-30, the Munich Agreement was the product of such 
negotiations, and the Sudetenland was handed over to Hitler after negotiations with 
Britain, France, and Italy.  As Hitler promised that this was his last territorial grab, the 
watching world relaxed and rejoiced as they thought war was avoided. 
What did Americans think of this scheme?  Opinion was split.  Many praised 
Chamberlain for maintaining peace.  Polls showed that at the end of the Sudeten 
negotiations, 59% of the population agreed that appeasement was better than going to 
war.  However, an equal amount thought that the Munich Agreement would not lead to 
peace but to war.23  The attitude was that of a recognized betrayal of Czechoslovakia but 
an acceptance of that as a necessity to maintain peace.  To the majority Americans, it was 
“the best thing to do” at the time.24  As The Bangor Daily News of Maine said, “betrayal 
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is a disagreeable word, especially when coupled with considerations of price, even when 
the price may be avoidance of war…betrayal is perhaps too strong a word to be applied to 
its course…but this is not a thing about which Americans can afford to be smug. We are 
not so keen about rescuing distressed sister democracies that we want to go to war on 
their account.”25  Americans felt sympathetic towards letting their sister democracy down 
but acknowledged the Czechs as a sacrifice to peace, that in the “general rejoicing”, a “a 
word of sympathy is expressed here and there for Czechoslovakia…”26  Part of the 
sentiment was directed towards Britain and France for breaking the Czech-Franco 
alliance treaties, but the relief of avoiding war overrode this feeling. 
Though the public rejoiced at the present peace, praise of Munich was usually 
followed by an expression of the uncertainty of the future and the possibility of war 
further on.  Only 8% of the public believed that Hitler had no more territorial ambitions 
in Europe.27  The newspapers acknowledged the uneasy peace, saying that “war has been 
prevented; peace remains to be perfected.”28  Some felt hopeful that Germany and its 
people wanted to avoid war in the future.  When Hitler rolled the military down the 
streets of Berlin, Germans met the display of aggression with negative public sentiment.29  
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Many people took this as a sign of Germany’s ability to be better in the future and some 
even went as far to say that Munich demonstrated that Hitler could be controlled in the 
future.30  Others called for more implementations of peace, such as more negotiations 
towards peace. 
For American public opinion, Hitler’s conquest of Czechoslovakia left the 
country more convinced a war would occur.  This translated into a new push for 
rearmament:  in February of 1938, half of the population had been willing to give up the 
Navy for disarmament, and in July of that year 68% had expressed desire for a world 
disarmament conference.  After the Munich crisis, this 71% now wanted a larger navy 
instead of a smaller one, and this number only kept on growing as 1939 approached.  The 
public wanted more adequate defense.  As the Daily Hawkeye Gazette of Burlington, 
Iowa put it, “And so America itself….has to arm with the rest [of the world powers].”31  
While people certainly did not want to fight in a European war, many grew convinced 
that if a war occurred, the United States would be swept into it.  Rearmament made the 
country prepared and marked effect of the Munich crisis. 
 After the conquest of Czechoslovakia, Poland was next on Hitler’s agenda.  The 
Treaty of Versailles cut out East Prussia from the Reich, giving it to Poland.  The Polish 
Corridor, which would have given Germany access to the sea, and Danzig, which was an 
important port city and historically part of Germany, had been carved out by Versailles 
and given to Poland, or put under heavy Polish economic influence.  To most Germans, 
these were the highest offenses of the treaty and Poland was the “most hated and despised 
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enemy.”32  From the very beginning of his rule, Hitler had wanted to seek vengeance on 
Poland.  
But since the Polish-German Pact of 1934, Poland had supported Germany in 
their endeavors. What changed in January of 1939 was Hitler’s insistence to retaking the 
Polish Corridor and Danzig.  Poland was only willing to replace the League of Nations’ 
guarantee of Danzig with a German-Polish agreement about the status of Danzig, but not 
willing to violate the pact and insisted that any German attempt to ‘“incorporate the Free 
City into the Reich must inevitably lead to conflict.’”33 
Still, Hitler persisted.  When Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia on March 
15, German forces flanked Poland.  War was looming on the horizon.  On March 22, 
Poland suggested a secret Anglo-Polish agreement for mutual assistance.  This led to 
Chamberlain’s declaration on March 31 that Britain and France would lend “all support 
in their power” if Poland was attacked. This marked the Allies’ turn to interventionism. 
How did the American public react to this? Most papers commended Chamberlain’s 
sudden shift in foreign policy, recognizing its importance to Poland and the world: “Do 
not underestimate the announcement of Prime Minister Chamberlain…the British French 
guarantee actually means something,” said the Oregonian.34  Some recognized that 
Chamberlain was too late in his policies.  A Richmond Times Dispatch cartoon agreed as 
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they published a tiny Chamberlain trying to rope a bloated Nazi foot back.35  All the 
while, the papers recognized that the world was closer to another war.  Still, publications 
continued in their detached tone—these were still far off problems, not the main issue of 
the United States’ concern. 
While this was the sentiment of the general public, Roosevelt had sent Hitler a 
telegram bluntly asking if Germany could “give assurance that your [German] armed 
forces will not attack or invade the territory of the following independent nations”36 and, 
then, listed 31 nations. 
Interestingly, in May 1939 the polls showed a dramatic 19% decrease in people 
who believed that a war would take place in the next year.37  What suddenly shifted the 
country to have more confidence in peace?  Did France and Britain’s pledge to get 
involved if aggression occurred convince the United States that Germany was too 
intimidated to attack Poland?  The opposite sentiment was found in the newspapers. 
Chamberlain had told the House of Commons that Poland was “not worth war” on May 
3. The press took this to mean that Britain and France had moved to negotiations, and the 
public seemed to believe that another Munich was possible.38 
Whatever the reason, the United States underestimated Hitler.  All throughout the 
summer, Hitler and his generals were making preparations towards war.  Negotiations 
occurred behind closed doors and the only major news that was widely discussed was the 
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Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact. From May, June, and July saw a significant drop in 
discussion of Hitler in papers. 
 By the end of August, war was again on the horizon as all sides militarized. In 
Berlin, the press felt that war was inevitable.39  While Hitler hoped the Soviet turn to 
neutrality dissuaded the British and cleared his way for his attack, Britain was firm in 
their opposition.  Hitler too was firm and went ahead with the attack anyway; falsely 
listing that Germany had first been provoked by Poland as an excuse.  Britain and France 
declared war two days later--September 3—when the German attack continued.  World 
War II had begun, and the American press, now more than ever, had a heightened 
uncertainty about American neutrality. 
 Though the public stressed how they did not want to get involved in another 
messy European conflict, the country was now ready for peaceful interventionism:  only 
1% wanted to enter the war, but 50% now supported some form of selling supplies—later 
manifested as the Lend-Lease Act.40 While it took an attack on American soil to convince 
the country to engage in violent interventionism, the end of the Polish conflict marked the 
beginning of formal American interventionism into World War II. Supported by the polls, 
Roosevelt called on Congress to revise the neutrality laws with one that allowed arms to 
be bought and carried on belligerent ships. Passed in December 4, 1939, the cash-and-
carry neutrality law marked the United States’ peaceful interventionism and 
transformation from isolationism. 
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From 1935 to 1939, the polls showed heavy favor of noninterventionism. 
Neutrality was on the minds of the American public and viewed as a crucial issue. In 
1935, when asked what the most important issue at the time was by Gallup, both 
Democratic and Republican members of the voting public put neutrality in their top five 
concerns. Additionally, 1935 was the year of the most isolationist sentiment. Roughly 
30% of the public felt that the United States should join if a war was involved. The 
attitude at the time was that of strong anti-war as people were still shaken from World 
War I. This was paired with calls for disarmament and a general desire for pacifism. 
When Czechoslovakia occurred, a shift happened. The United States had not 
thought a European war would arise. Now, the public felt that war was bound to occur. 
The United States just wanted to stay out of it. This caused the public to advocate for 
self-defense, a change from rearmament. However, it was not until Poland and the 
European start of the war, that the United States decided to engage in non-violent 
interventionism through the selling of supplies to any belligerent nation. Thus, the turn 
from isolationism was complete. 
These sentiments were largely universal, with only slight fluctuations between 
region and party. Largely, these shifts were bipartisan as numbers in support for 
interventionism went up among Democrats and Republicans alike. And while some 
accused the Gallup Poll of being too Republican and the Roper Poll of being too 
Democratic in leaning, these party affiliations did not interfere with the opinions they 
recorded—both showed a public willing to intervene. 
All throughout these years, slight regional differences were demonstrated. 1935-
1936 showed regions farther West, such as the Mountain, Pacific Cast, and the 
	 16	
Midwestern (called East Central by agencies) leaning more isolationist while New 
England and the Mid-Atlantic had more interventionist sentiments. Consistently, the 
South was the most interventionist out of all the regions. When asked about needing the 
approval of the people to declare war, only 70% of Southerners felt that this was 
necessary, 9% lower than the 79% percent of Mountain region dwellers who said yes.41 
Why were Southerners more interventionist than their countrymen? There is a 
correlation between this and party affiliation. The South was the most supportive of the 
Democratic Party and Roosevelt, and Roosevelt was an advocate for interventionism. 
Conversely, the overwhelming majority of Southern papers were Democratic and 
supported Roosevelt.42 Roosevelt was a more interventionist than many of his 
contemporaries, pushing for the change in the Neutrality Acts.43 
In a short four years, the country shifted from heavily isolationist to in clear 
support of the Allies. Examining sources as reactionary to the global events that occurred 
saw how this happened. Allowing these sources and data to speak for themselves, clear 
connections were made, mapping out the story of American isolationism to 
interventionism through the use of primary sources. What was discovered was far more 
complex than one voice of opinion, but several that were heard together to shape the 
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